Regulation and MVNOs: a Happy End?‎

MVNOs are becoming in some European countries a real alternative to mobile ‎operators in overcrowded markets. Operators identified as SMP in market 15 ‎‎(Rec. 2003/311/EC) or market 7 (Rec. 2007/879/EC), can be imposed as remedy ‎to open their networks to MVNOs. In this case regulator should help MVNOs to ‎develop their own strategic proposition. ‎

In April 2008, Malta Communications Authority (MCA) issued guidelines to MVNOs, ‎Enhanced Service Providers (ESP) and Service Providers (SP), following a November 2005 ‎decision on market 15. For the first time in the small holiday island with less than 400.000 ‎mobile users, competition in mobile services is becoming reality and alternative service ‎providers are coming to the market. Vodafone Malta already announced several new ‎agreements for hosting ESPs, and it is the evidence that even small markets can sustain ‎diverse and innovative service providers.‎

MVNOs has been often used in mature markets by MNOs for several reasons:‎

‎-‎ to reduce regulatory pressures or to comply with market’s review decisions;‎
‎-‎ voluntarily to have a ready way to enter in new markets and win new customers;‎
‎-‎ reduce spare voice capacity, mainly for small network providers;‎
‎-‎ as pre-emptive move to reduce overall attractiveness of the market and increase ‎barriers to entry;‎
‎-‎ increase market power in international roaming (e.g. united-mobile).‎

The main reason for being anti-MVNO is the treat of cannibalization of current business and ‎increase of competition. However, when operators realized that in saturated market achieving ‎growth is very difficult and that their brand could not achieve all nice markets (e.g. ethnic ‎groups) or could be active in all segments some operators realized the positive potential effect ‎on their cash flow of MVNOs alternative business model. Some of them in very developed ‎markets also realized that the future of their business model were less focused on low-end and ‎prepaid customers, but on more post-paid and business customers. A similar concept is also ‎argued by Chriss Zook in a recent article on the Harward Business Review (04/07), he ‎emphasis on the research of the core business and to reconfigure orphan products.‎

Regulation should help MVNOs to develop their own strategic proposition and not just re-sell ‎pre packaged services. It is important for MVNOs to have a clear and stable harmonized ‎European framework where they can replicate their business model and invest in innovative ‎Pan-European services. For example, try to access SIMYO webpage in Germany and Spain, ‎they have a strong brand identity with tariffs that are almost identical (€9c for voice in all ‎networks and for SMS).‎

However, we should not limit competition to price. Another key issue is service ‎differentiation. Regulation should also promote differentiation in business models.‎

Some examples of MVNOs and their main business strategy:‎

Country MVNO Hosting ‎ MNO Strategy
Belgium Mobisud Belgacom Etcnic group
Belgium Aldi Base Price
Italy Tiscali Telecom Italia Bundling
Italy Postemobile Vodafone Service
Poland Aster City ‎Cable PTK ‎Centertel Bundling
Spain Jazztel Orange Bundling

World Lycambobile Many Etcnic group and price

World United-Mobile Many price and differentiation


There are some issues that should be discussed and analyzed from a regulatory point of view, ‎these are:‎

‎-‎ rights and obligations of MVNOs;‎
‎-‎ interconnection rights of MVNOs;‎
‎-‎ termination rates, impact on business case;‎
‎-‎ wholesale prices for MVNOs (bundle of minutes and volume discounts);‎
‎-‎ numbering range and routing;‎
‎-‎ legal interception;‎
‎-‎ number portability.‎


Conclusions
In many countries the regulatory framework has been neutral to MVNOs and their life has ‎been very difficult; in other markets the threat of more strength regulatory intervention (e.g. in ‎Switzerland, Italy and Spain) has been enough to open up networks and to promote price ‎competition. ‎

What MVNOs ask is certainty and transparent offering from MNOs and a clear regulatory ‎framework. MVNOs find themselves as second class operator, no rights and no control over ‎customers. ‎

Moreover, it is often the case that there’s no effective competition between MNOs and when ‎you are in the deal with one MNO you have to remain with it: sunk costs and number ‎portability problems, are likely to override all benefits in migrating to another MNO.‎

Finally, in some markets the so called Service Providers or light MVNOs struggle in ‎becoming full MVNOs. I can see a MNO wholesale service portfolio for MNOs as the limit to ‎MVNOs’ business case and innovation.‎


ww.regulation.tk

"II European MVNO Summit" Economist Conferences

I have been invited to partecipate to a panel discussion at the next European MVNO Summit in Rome this June organised by Economist Conferences. I will be partecipating to the first round table: "European regulation framework, perspectives and proposals" with Agcom's commissioner Enzo Savarese and my friend of Ovum Stefano Nicoletti.

MVNOs have been very important in the european market for many reasons:

1) can radically change the market's conditions.
2) appeal to nice market's segments: for example, ethnic groups that use their mobile phone for call abroad.
3) give a fresh and innovative look to an old and static market: for example, with new price plans and services.
4) open to completely new business cases: for example United Mobile (a roaming operator) and Blyk (the free mobile network in UK).
5) increase efficiency of the network (especially for UMTS players that have large capacity) and reduce costs.

Time to hear from leading experts on the subject, don't hesitate come to Rome with me!

www.regulation.tk

Regulatory Accounting Roundtable 2008

Cost recovery, transparency and consistency, cost model auditing and simplification in cost accounting are the priorities for the industry and main challenges for the years to come, according to participants to the Regulatory Accounting Roundtable 2008 (RAR08), a high level meeting organized by OFCOM last week.

Last week I had the pleasure of chairing the RAR08, European experts and a delegation from NTC Thailand actively participated to the discussion on the future trends in regulatory accounting policy.

Delegates agreed that a priority for NRAs was to promote transparency and confidence with stakeholders and reduce the incentives of SMP operators to have subnormal cost recovery from regulatory activities.

An interesting presentation came from GSMA, they believe, as I wrote in this blog some time ago, that pricing mechanisms for interconnection should be tailor made for the situation product and market. A standardized pricing mechanism is one solution, but certainly not the best in log term.



Another issue emerged, may be just a trend, many operators agreed that a solution for all our problems in cost accounting and interconnection might be introducing in Europe a regulatory environment that promotes a pricing mechanism similar to Bill & Keep. However, nobody could answer in full to my questions regarding drawbacks of the system:

1) is it possible to have an open market with Bill & Keep? Bill & Keep might promote competition within existing players with same traffic volume, but might reduce competition from new entrants that will face (at least in the short term) much higher termination costs that current players.

2) how should unbalances in traffic volumes be handled? Can small operator ‘profit’ from Bill & Keep or is it (as it is in the internet world) a system advantage only for large players?

3) One operator argued that it will be happy to introduce Bill & Keep on a bilateral basis with the incumbent, but that probably smaller operators will be not able to have the same conditions as the others in the market.

I believe that Bill & Keep might become new barrier to entry in the market, what do you think?

I think that if we introduce Bill & Keep as it is, we might end up with a cost based termination rate valid for small players, that will not be able to ‘play’ a role or enter the market, while existing mid and large operators will be able to have a cost advantage and may-be a sustainable competitive advantage.

Julio Villalobos from SVP Advisors, gave us an open minding presentation on the complexity of the auditing process for regulatory cost modeling. I believe that auditing will be one of the most important activities in the future to come (with the new commission’s recommendation on interconnection due to see the light very soon) and that the importance to validate regulatory cost modeling will arise very soon when interconnection price will collapse. We have time to think about this issue!

Finally, I have to speak about the change in trend from small mobile operators. I wrote about this issue in this blog before. My friend John Blackmore from H3G explained that mobile termination rates based on LRIC and large common costs give suboptimal results now, in time of full coverage and small growth of the market.

I fully agree with him, that usually too many irrelevant costs are included, under full competition firms can only recover their marginal costs of producing the extra output. Common and joint costs should be therefore not recovered by this ‘monopoly’ product.

Why should we subsidize mobile operators, usually large and very rich, with fat-cat termination rates? We can if there is a long-term regulatory objective (e.g. coverage or low retail rate), but sometime at cost distorting the market.

Good point John, did you speak with the commission recently?

Presentations files can be found here

www.regulation.tk

Setting the Course.

I will be joining SVP Advisors in August as responsible of the regulatory department.

SVP Advisors is a boutique consultancy firm specialised in regulation and financial analysis based in Madrid, Spain.

SVP Advisors won the bid for auditing Telefonica's Regulatory Accounts for 2007.

Plans on Termination Rates: No Good News

The commission presented yesterday, to a selected number of representatives of NRAs, a plan for a new recommendation on Termination Rates.

Commission's objective is to achieve a coherent harmonized approach to ex-ante regulation of termination rates. They realized that, despite a common approach (LRIC) there is still 'inconsistent application of remedies' and that there are 'different levels of termination rates across Europe'.

The good news is that the commission is supported by ERG experts on this matter and that they plan to have a transitional period to achieve symmetrical termination rates.

I believe that symmetrical termination rates should be the objective of each NRAs, if we consider an efficient operator there's only one 'efficient' termination rates. Ideally one per country, but potentially, as expected by the commission in the long run, one per the entire European continent.

The bad news is that the commission is still in trouble defining the 'ideal' parameter and approach. At this stage of the process, I would argue that no recommendation is better that a bad 'recommendation" and that the fasted and less painful solution would be a kind of Bill & Keep solution with a level of cap, a trash hold, of about 10-15% above where symmetrical (ideally low) termination rates are charged.

The reason is simple, to prevent destructive retail tariffs, "Free calls to operator's A customers", so that I gain new customers and the costs of these customers are burden by the largest operators that have to increase capacity to its network.

What do you think on this issue? And what about fixed to mobile termination rates? Will it be the old / new problem of next year?

n

Lower Termination Rates for All: A New Hope

European smaller mobile operators have changed their strategies on regulated mobile termination rates.



In the last ten years smaller operators have always argued that size and market's entry matters when speaking about termination rates. Smaller operators due to lack of economies of scale and scope and the market's situation would have the right to ask for premium rates for terminating calls on their networks.

The Mobile Challengers Group (Italy's Wind, Poland's Play, Turkey's Avea, Bouygues Telecom, E-Plus, Base and 3 Europe) is promoting a change of course. They argue that, since termination rates based on LRIC are way above costs, Regulators imposing these pricing methodologies are promoting the position of a handful of large operators to the detriment of new entrants.

The Mobile Challengers Groups realized that "network economy matters", they terminate less calls that they send. They are net payers to large operators. For example, 3 has large outflows of cash due to terminations.

Their solution looks 'simple', reducing termination rates at 'marginal' costs.

They did not present, however, solid evidences on the level of reductions necessary to solve the problem and, as support, a cost model reproducing an efficient marginal cost for termination. The lack of evidences and weak/faulty arguments do not facilitate the regulator's work.


Picture Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/63878179@N00/956430203/

NGN Regulatory and Commercial Aspects

Commercial aspects of NGN interconnection should be not underestimated when setting wholesale rates.

We know that in wholesale there are two main groups of services that will be interconnected: regulated and not regulated. We can include also two other categories more common in the retail market, services that are perfectly homogeneous and 'status' goods.

What I intend with this?

Perfectly homogeneous a.k.a. commodities: The firm in this case is a passive actor with absolutely no power over the market for its products. This is a key feature of the ‘perfect competition’ model of the market place, in which the individual firm is a price-taker (e.g. voice services).

Premium (Veblen goods): The firm has a power on the market of this product. Elasticity for these products can be positive or neutral.(e.g. Euro2008).

We should consider all these elements when we decide the pricing mechanism we want to choose for our wholesale product.

Analyzing the issue I realized that there are a multitude of pricing mechanisms that are not always compatibles with retail. If we run a compatibility test between pricing and charging principles we see that they are almost always only directly compatible (for example, QoS at wholesale with QoS at retail).

In my study I have identified the implications at retail level of applying indirect relashionships. It might seems absurd but the less destructive methodology remains the per minute charging. I am not saying that it should be always used, but that there should be a direct relationships between wholesale charging and retail if we want to reduce market's distortion.

This would suggest that ….

1- there isn’t a best way to price products where there are a multitude of diverse services, but there’s a multitude of options.
2- Therefore it depends on several environmental factors e.g. product, market and regulation.
3- However combinations of models are not infinite or without constrains.
4- the importance of costs of wholesale products to assure innovation, fair competition and flexibility in the market.

Net Neutrality: Who Pays for it?

In the last two days I had the pleasure to meet and discuss with Martin Cave, Director of the Centre for Management under Regulation, Warwick Business School, Coventry. He came to Switzerland to present his views on the economics of the ICT market at the annual Comdays. A must be event of the Swiss ICT industry.

Martin highlighted a contradiction of the Net Neutrality principle. Capacity doesn't come for free. Someone has to pay for extra capacity used for new services and the investments operators do for providing a good QOS.

I personally agree with the basic concept of any-to-any communication of the bit and net neutrality. I also respect the decision of some governments to block inappropriate content, such as porn and offensive material. I personally disagree that providers can decide what kind of services I - customer - can have (e.g. block my Skype or Zatoo packets).

As Martin said, someone has to pay for the 'neutrality'.

I agree with this principle, let's look together what the options are:

- operators, can recover investments from the monthly broadband subscription or from advertising: a mix of paid and advertised support model might be the solution.

- Operators, can charge a premium for valued content (efficient pricing) to recover these costs.

- Service providers (e.g. google) can support the extra costs with a revenue sharing model.

- Finally, governments, communities and philanthropic associations.

I know, it's not so easy to pick the best option. However, we should be aware that we will be confronted with this dilemma soon.

As already argued in this Blog there is another risk, the formation of new bottlenecks from network / content to distribution. The distributor of the 'information' (everything that can be digitized) might be the next real monopolist. See for example, the rights for sport events, such as Euro08!.

More Info:

6. Biel-Bienne Kommunikationstage, 25. / 26.10.2007, im Kongresshaus, Biel

Online advertising and the decline of the broadcasting sector

On 19. September Ofcom, the UK independent regulator and competition authority for communications industries, hosted a briefing to address current and future regulatory issues in the UK broadcasting sector.

What impresses is not not the regulatory agenda, that aims to promote the development of next generation communication services, such as HD TV, but the status of a part of the traditional broadcasting sector.

In particular, the broadcasting sectors is facing new forms of competition from telcos, cable operators and 'search engines'. Competition comes mainly from production of programs and in advertising budget; "launching additional channels has been successful but not enough to offset losses on core channel".

Advertising

Since 12 months ago online advertising agencies, such as Adsense and Doubleclick, did not compete directly with traditional advertising agencies for a share of the advertising market.

What happened?

Traditional advertising agencies did recognize the opportunity of online advertising, but were not able to adapt and transform their value-chains, in particular production and distribution, and corporate strategy to the online world. Combining online and offline advertising would be too destructive to their businesses. As in the 60s TV changed the market, now Internet shifts part of the advertising market to new communication tools that have (for the moment) the exclusive advantage over TVs to be interactive and the response measurable.

The online advertising is already dominated by digital-born firms, Google owns Adsense while Microsoft owns Doubleclick, that have two advantages over traditional advertising agencies to know the technology and the market well. On the other end, advertising agencies can produce unique advertising propositions for Internet as they have the right human assets and capabilities.

Broadcasting companies can reduce competitive pressure by doing what they do best and concentrate on their core capabilities, produce shows and entertainment. Good quality shows will attract advertisers and new interactive technologies will fill the gap between the online and offline broadcasting sector.

This a evolution and not a revolution, don't panic!

Relevant Markets: A New Hope?

The commission is investing a considerable political capital in the deregulation of the communication market. In particular there are a main issues in the draft recommendation on relevant markets I like to highlight.

The exclusion of markets in the forthcoming commission recommendation represents a clear political signal of success to European stakeholders. In other words it means that competition works, regulation has been effective and it was just temporary devil. However, commission's arguments to justify the exclusion of retail markets do not fully satisfy and could be dangerous for policymakers and competition in the future.

The inclusion of the old markets will be still possible, but NRAs will face a significant burden of proof to demonstrate those market can be again regulated. Can you imagine the commission, after having invested considerable resources in deregulation, agreeing with NRAs that the devil is back?

NGN Interconnection: far from an agreement

There is no agreement or even a consensus on how NGN interconnection in UK will look like. The current debate is so far from reality that many operators (someone says also BT) do not know even what the problems are. Part of the challenges arises from a general lack of experience in interconnection of a so large and extended set of products and services.

Consultants, regulators and academics have different and divergent views on how to set interconnect rates for NGN. Views essentially spread from bill&keep innovative models to old-fashioned per minute or per service charging.

A possible solution might be to charge per 'contended capacity' and per 'quality of service'. However, even here there is no agreement whether voice needs more or less priority.

Some observers argue that voice do not need more quality as it can be accepted and priced at low quality (see Skype). Therefore regulated voice services will be almost free of charge and priced according to capacity. Others instead argue that voice needs a high prioritisation and should cost more than other services. What is clear from the above discussion is that there is still lot to say and argue about this topic in the future.

Interconnection of NGN can remain billed per minute for quite some time during the transitional phase, even if minutes are not a cost driver for NGN. However, prices probably should be adapted to the costs of an efficient operator (e.g. overcapacity should be reduced) in order to avoid irrelevant costs.

Simplicity and continuity in pricing models (for retail customers at least) are and should remain a must in the near future in order to reduce cases of anti-competitive behaviors and the effect of bottlenecks. Operators should look for a solution that combine the need for stable rates and the request of innovation and profitability from shareholders. Two kings for the same throne!

Openreach & Co: the network separtion

BT Openreach has solved many of the old-time competition problems and promoted the deepest level of infrastructure competition possible. In Sweden and Italy, both Telia Sonera and Telecom Italia have started the process of creating clones of Openreach in an attempt to satisfy upcoming regulatory pressures and EU attempt to increase NRAs powers with functional separation.

However, the approach of the two clones is different. While in Sweden PTS has announced lighter regulatory pressures on Telia-Sonera in case of voluntary network separation, in Italy AGCOM is struggling to convince Telecom Italia that network separation does not mean a complete relief from all obligations in all markets. Telecom Italia proposed to have all retail caps levied.

Network separation can be the solution for some competition problem, but it is not a panacea or a one-size fits all incumbent strategy. It a tool that should be adapted to the environment it wishes to regulate. In some cases, I believe that a sound cost separation system can give similar results to a fraction of the costs and time of a separation.

Moreover, we should not underestimate the cultural factor. Something that worked in UK and Sweden, can be very dangerous in other organizations and cultures. Process and procedures should be therefore carefully adapted and alternatives evaluated before taking any decision. A network separation is a radical change that can take years to recover in case of very complex or old-fashioned organizations structures, therefore, distortion effects on competition can be unpredictable.

United Mobile and Roaming Regulation

The Erotariff is available or will be soon available in Europe after one of the fastest legislation processes in the history of the European Parliament. It is a clear example on how regulation can be positive for consumers and competition.

Let me explain you, I do not mean that consumers will pay less, operators are already re balancing tariffs and packages and re-negotiating wholesale charges to cope with the reduction of international roaming revenues.

It is just a start! Let wait and see how the industry evolves. For example united-mobile have launched a new virtual roaming services from the Isle of Jersey with incredible good rates (http://www.united-mobile.com/)

New and Old regulation

Firms of the new economy do not like to be regulated even if they hold a form of monopoly. Customers, like Microsoft, standards, like Intel or services, like Goggle are new forms of bottlenecks. For example, Goggle Advertising service hold some 60% of the global market share and is starting to attack new markets, yes even software games will have advertising.