Termination a new step ahead, or not... (update)

Update from 18/08/09 post

Today some friends of mine are celebrating after the Commission's new heartbreaking announcement regarding termination rates. Others will be surprised and astonished, as I am now.

This revelation could be the result of the hot summer in Brussels or the start of a new trend. This is for you to decide.

On 17/08 the Commission released a comment "Telecoms: European Commission comments on the German regulator's proposals for the regulation of fixed and mobile termination rates" regarding the German NRAs proposal to not regulate alternative operators and MVNOs’ termination rates.

BNetzA's argument is very simple - in my view - since termination rates of fixed alternative operators are the same as those of DT and MVNOs, as well as mobile termination rates being the same as the hosting operators, there's no need to regulate. Regulation would be not proportionate to the case and would do more harm than good.

Background

In its decisions of mid-2006 BNetzA expressed its expectation at that time that this would be the last time asymmetric rates were accepted. Previously BNetzA accepted asymmetric rates for two reasons:

1- Limited impact (traffic of alternative operator was very low)

2- Structural cost differences due to economies of scale

BNetzA is of the opinion that alternative operators’ rates should be below the one of an efficient operator

“Entgelte an ihren Kosten der effizienten Leistungsbereitstellung erfolgt, so dass die Entgelte gegenüber der Deutschen Telekom AG nur eine Obergrenze darstellen und eventuelle Effizienzgewinne der alternativen Teilnehmernetzbetreiber bei diesen verbleiben.“

Therefore, they should be the same of DT.

What is the Commission’s point of view?

"The Commission stressed that commercial agreements together with a non-discrimination

obligation cannot always ensure interconnection and that operators do not raise termination rates above costs."

This is true, but it's also true that we do not have an indication of termination costs of these operators in Germany right now. The French NRA indicated in 2008 in a Market Analysis that cost-orientation obligations for Altnets were not proportionate

"It has invited BNetzA to impose an access (interconnection) obligation and a cost

orientation obligation on each of the alternative fixed network and virtual mobile network

operators, taking into account the Commission's recent Recommendation on termination rates

(IP/09/710)."

What are the implications for fixed operators?

All 56 small operators should calculate the costs of providing termination services and set termination rates on costs. [can you imagine reviewing and negotiating the new tariffs?]

Potentially some will have higher termination rates of DT, therefore, I am sure DT will not accept them and go to court. Moreover, it is possible it will have an impact also on the retail market.

NOTE:

I cannot be certain that 56 termination rates are consistent with the recent recommendation on termination rates that advocate one single termination rate for mobile networks. What do you think?

What are the implications for MVNOs?

MVNOs will have to set termination rates at the same levels of the negotiated MVNO termination price (for non full MVNOS) or as a combination of their costs. Also, in this case it is probable that we will have several MTRs for every small MVNO.

NOTE:

Again, as above, I am not sure the commission has really internalised its own recommendations. What do you think?

What about in other countries?

UK

There are reciprocal termination rates since 1997. In a statement issued in July 1997, Network Charges from 1997, the Director General supported the principle of reciprocal charging for Operators termination. The aim of reciprocity was to ensure competitive neutrality between BT and Operators and to remove the distortive effects of the call termination externality. The current Operator Charge Change Noticedistinguish between single switching operators and multi switching operators.

France

In France, reciprocal termination charges were ordered in earlier rulings, in 1999 and 2001. In decisions taken on 20 June 2003, ART has allowed Completel, Estel and UPC France to require charges from France Télécom until the end of 2007 not more than the level of charges that the incumbent had levied for like services five years previously. In 2008 Arcep in a market review proposed new caps and a glide path to reach harmonisation.

Italy

In Italy Agcom decided with a costing model differential termination rates for Altnets, however, the asymmetry will be eliminated in July 2010. As you can see from the table below Fastweb had in 2007 a 400% higher termination rate than Telecom Italia.

	Fastweb	Wind	BT Italia	Tiscali	Tele2	Eutelia	Other Operators
1/07/2007	2,01	1,90	1,78	1,76	1,45	1,25	1,25
1/07/2008	1,53	1,44	1,38	1,36	1,15	1,02	1,02
1/07/2009	1,05	1,01	0,97	0,97	0,86	0,80	0,80
1/07/2010	0,57	0,57	0,57	0,57	0,57	0,57	0,57

My view

It is a very interesting development to a very boring and old subject. I don't think the effort is worth the costs (potentially very high for operators and regulators) of developing costing models, negotiating new tariffs, changing business models and retail rates. It will be interesting to see the development of this new trend and monitor its implication.

The international experience highlight that harmonisation will be reached in two or three years in Europe. Thus, the burden or calculating with a cost model termination rates for alternative operators is very high, and, in my view, it does not justify the effort.

What do you think?

www.regulation.tk

Reccomendation on Termination Rates 2008

The commission has published for public consultation before summer their last work on termination rates. The consultation last till mid of september. You can find here the relevant documents.

It is quite long time that the commision is triying to sell their position to european stakeholders: harmonisation of termination rates in all Europe is a must for an efficient communication market.

If we look at the broad impact of this reccomendation and the forthcomming challenges of convergence of network a proactive approach of the commission in this direction makes sense.

However, if the objective of the reccomendation is noble, we can hardly say the same for the tools used to achive it.

The commission obsession on using a LRIC bottom up model as a panacea is not supported by any empirical evidence of its effectiveness and superiority against a FAC or a LRIC top down. The IRG/ERG report on regulatory in practice have demostrated several times that there is not a direct correlation between harmonisation, lower interconnect rates and the use of a LRIC model.

For example: UK, currently the country with the lower fixed termination rates in Europe, uses a audited FAC and not the so loved bottom up LRIC. As my friend Gavin was used to say, if you use the right efficiency measures and audit properly the data received you will have comparable, if not in some cases superior results.

We can reconise that the commision knows about the weakness of a LRIC bottom up model in the final words of the draft reccomendation when is mentioned the reconciliation of the data with a top-down audited model.

There are more and more critics to the reccomenation I could do, however, I leave this exercise to the people that are going to answer to the reccomendation. What is imporant is that we discuss about it and may be a new course to the use of LRIC has been taken.

We have many years to prepare ourselves to the new rules, that we will have just to follow; someone out there will have to re-allocate costs to other services and others will have to check this allocations. So just follow the rules? No not really, you have time to send your comments to the draft reccomendation!

www.regulation.tk

Relevant Markets: A New Hope?

The commission is investing a considerable political capital in the deregulation of the communication market. In particular there are a main issues in the draft recommendation on relevant markets I like to highlight.

The exclusion of markets in the forthcoming commission recommendation represents a clear political signal of success to European stakeholders. In other words it means that competition works, regulation has been effective and it was just temporary devil. However, commission's arguments to justify the exclusion of retail markets do not fully satisfy and could be dangerous for policymakers and competition in the future.

The inclusion of the old markets will be still possible, but NRAs will face a significant burden of proof to demonstrate those market can be again regulated. Can you imagine the commission, after having invested considerable resources in deregulation, agreeing with NRAs that the devil is back?