31 January 2008

International Roaming and Switzerland: bad taste


European tourists using their mobile phones in the French Guiana are paying less than when they are in Switzerland.

How is it possible? Thanks to the Eurotariff, the European regulated tariff for European roamers.

The French Guiana, despite far far away from Europe, is part of the French Overseas Departments and Territories and therefore legally France. As consequence of the new regulation Swiss mobile operators negotiating wholesale roaming rates (IOTs) with European will be considered 'rest of the world' and will have to pay much more that their
Neighbors for the right to roam.

What are the implications for the Swiss mobile market? is the wholesale market now competitive? and what can we do to solve this problem?

In April I will be part of a panel discussion on this topic at the next IIR "Roaming World Congress" in Vienna.

more to come...

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23 January 2008

NGN Regulatory and Commercial Aspects



Commercial aspects of NGN interconnection should be not underestimated when setting wholesale rates.

We know that in wholesale there are two main groups of services that will be interconnected: regulated and not regulated. We can include also two other categories more common in the retail market, services that are perfectly homogeneous and 'status' goods.

What I intend with this?

Perfectly homogeneous a.k.a. commodities: The firm in this case is a passive actor with absolutely no power over the market for its products. This is a key feature of the ‘perfect competition’ model of the market place, in which the individual firm is a price-taker (e.g. voice services).

Premium (Veblen goods): The firm has a power on the market of this product. Elasticity for these products can be positive or neutral.(e.g. Euro2008).

We should consider all these elements when we decide the pricing mechanism we want to choose for our wholesale product.

Analyzing the issue I realized that there are a multitude of pricing mechanisms that are not always compatibles with retail. If we run a compatibility test between pricing and charging principles we see that they are almost always only directly compatible (for example, QoS at wholesale with QoS at retail).

In my study I have identified the implications at retail level of applying indirect relashionships. It might seems absurd but the less destructive methodology remains the per minute charging. I am not saying that it should be always used, but that there should be a direct relationships between wholesale charging and retail if we want to reduce market's distortion.

This would suggest that ….

1- there isn’t a best way to price products where there are a multitude of diverse services, but there’s a multitude of options.
2- Therefore it depends on several environmental factors e.g. product, market and regulation.
3- However combinations of models are not infinite or without constrains.
4- the importance of costs of wholesale products to assure innovation, fair competition and flexibility in the market.

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04 January 2008

Intrafirm collaboration Myth or Reality?



Can competitive firms have a collaborative relationship in a fast changing and competitive market? I tried to address this question in this short essay on collaborative strategy I developed for a client last year. I post here a short extract.

An extensive literature review reveals how Intrafirm collaboration is often the result of an egoistical behavior, a wish of disproportionate collaborative rents and advantages, expected long-term externalities and sometimes irrational trust on alliance partners.
We can observe that there is asymmetry of expected pay-off depending on the size of the firm, the invested resources and the kind of private and common benefits that arise in collaborating in a project in particular or in the organisation in general.
We also note how trust and cultural fit are important for a successful alliance. Change in the external environment and distance from the buyer can become a powerful stimulus and interest aggregator for alliances. We argue that when a fast-changing market is not under control, even strong partners’ private interests can have more chances to overlap with common interests, consequently alliances are more likely to be successful.

From the above discussion and in particular from Khanna et al (1998) ‘relative scope’ concept we propose a conceptual framework (figure 1).

We identified four archetypes of partners in alliances according to the ‘relative scope’ and the interest to collaborate (‘collaboration factor’). The ‘relative scope’ values are from zero to one, a firm that scores zero will have no interests in participating in the alliance.

If the value is closer to ‘one’ the firm will have interests only in markets or areas of strategic interests covered by the alliance.

The ‘collaborative factor’ represents the collaborative effort of a firm in the organisation, its values are from high (H) to low (L).

The proposed archetypes are:

Philanthropic: these are firms that do not have high interests in the organisation but still continue to be active in everyday works, for example, for strategic or political reasons. A philanthropic company should evaluate whether to continue or not the collaboration or, alternatively, reduce its activities (blue arrow).

Blasé: firms in this quadrant of the model should be leaving the organisation soon, they probably do not fit anymore with the alliance, for example, for changed market conditions.

Hyperactive: They are the fostering members and have strong interests and commitments in the organisation.

Selfish: the decision of these firms to collaborate is strong only when their private interests overlap with current activities. Some of them were ‘Hyperactive’ members (red arrow) that have fulfilled their urgent interests.

Companies can sit everywhere in the face of the cube and will tend to follow the path described by the arrows in the direction of an alliance’s self extinction.

Figure 1: The cube of collaborative alliance

Source: own analysis.

We identified in this section a number of structural conditions and internal and eternal factors able to facilitate companies to act and behave as collaborators instead of as rivals.

We believe that is worth now to select and summarize them. We found that alliances are likely to be effective and succeed when there are number of conditions (not necessary all together):

the cost of developing and working in the alliance is lower than future benefits;

common and private benefits overlaps or are expected to overlap;

there is no zero-sum game, where the benefit of one member entails a corresponding loss for others;

organisations are diverse and belongs to a variety of complementing and competing industries;

there is strategic and cultural fit;

members of the alliance compete in some but not in all markets;

there is distance to buyer’s interests,

absorptive capacity and

redistribution of knowledge among business units.